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Tokenism in political discourse has two distinct meanings. First, if we choose to view politics
broadly, that is, in terms of the pattern of outcomes (material and otherwise) generated by a
particular society, tokenism is defined as the practice of satisfying the moral requirement for
the inclusion of members of structurally disadvantaged people in groups that are better
placed in society. This maintains the idea that social mobility is available to all when it is not.
Second, if we limit our definition of politics to those institutions and practices that are
designated as the specifically political, set against civil society and the family, tokenism is
defined as the practice of appeasing or placating a demand for a particular course of action.
This act of placation is generally perceived as both instrumentally unsatisfactory and morally
inadequate.
Overview
In everyday parlance, the word token has no intrinsically negative connotations and the
meanings attributed to it are quite diverse. A token is often an artifact, representative of
another object or a system of relationships. For example, the physical forms that money takes
—notes, coins, checks, shells—are tokens of particular quanta of value. Similarly, a token can
be an artifact representative of relationship between particular individuals and can symbolize,
for example, enduring affection (a lock of hair, a wedding ring) or indeed animosity or a
portent of ill tidings—the “black spot” in Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel Treasure Island,
indicating the receiver would soon meet his demise. Equally, the word token can be used to
describe an action or gesture. For example, one might attend an event (a wedding, a funeral)
as a token of one’s relationship to the betrothed or the deceased.
However, if we change the word from token to tokenism, lift it out of everyday language and
place it in the lexicon of the social sciences (sociology and politics in particular), tokenism has
overwhelmingly negative connotations. The definition of tokenism presented here is divided
into two main sections. The first provides an account of tokens and tokenism as it has
developed in the literature of sociology, by focusing on the work of Rosabeth Moss Kanter
(1977). This discussion is set against the backdrop of a broad understanding of politics as the
outcomes generated by a particular society—or in the words of Harold D. Lasswell (1936),
“who gets what, when and how.” The second section explores the way that the idea of
tokenism is understood in the political arena, that is, in the institutions and practices that are
concerned with the exercising of authority in society more generally. In order to arrive at an
understanding of tokenism, it is juxtaposed against both symbolism and realism in political
language.
Sociological Theories of Tokens
Sociological theories of tokenism ought to be understood as being informed by their
antecedents in the social theory developed by the classical sociologists of the 19th and early
20th centuries. In particular, the theory of tokenism as it was explored and debated in the late
1960s and 1970s was concerned, in a very similar way that both Émile Durkheim and Robert
K. Merton were, with the relationship between morality as an element of the social fabric of
society social structure and the possibility of social mobility. However, unlike the broadly
functionalist account of Robert Merton and very much in tune with the critical intent of much
writing in the 1960s and 1970s, theories of tokenism describe it as a mechanism by which
inequalities are unjustly maintained in modern capitalist patriarchal and White-dominated
societies.
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Building on the theoretical groundwork set down by Merton and drawing on the work of the
Swiss sociologist Georg Simmel, the American sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter developed a
numerical theory of token-dominant behavior. Kanter was interested in the varying effects that
different proportions of people had on particular societies, wherein their differences were
defined by their “master status”—sex, race, and ethnicity, for example. Kanter’s is a theory of
group behavior based upon proportionality of dominant groups to less dominant groups in
any population (whether this be a nation-state, a workplace, or a social club) particularly the
relationship between “dominants” and “tokens.”
For Kanter there were four different types of populations: uniform—comprising one type of
person only, skewed—characterized by a large preponderance of one group over another
(approximately 85:15 proportionally), tilted—wherein the ratio is around 65:35, and balanced
populations, exhibiting a ratio of between 60:40 and 50:50. It was the second type of group
—skewed—that particularly interested Kanter, principally because a variety of different
populations in society exhibit approximately this ratio, particularly (but not exclusively) where
men form the numerically dominant group and women are the tokens.
It is important to recognize that while Kanter focused on the sociological effects of proportions
when examining the interrelationships between men and women, equally she argued that the
sociological effects of proportionality could be generalized. In other words, patterns of
dominant-token behavior were not dependent upon the master status of either group. Rather,
the type proportionality in all populations will influence the dynamics of group behavior in that
population in predictable ways.
Turning to Kanter’s particular interest in the relationship between tokens and dominants,
Kanter’s theory of tokens comprised three propositions. First, to be labeled a token (whether
this is an individual or a group of people) inscribed a status as a symbol of that group.
Second, Kanter argued that a specific dynamics of tokenism are likely to operate, particularly
when the master status of the tokens is obvious (women in a male-dominated group; Black
people in a White-dominated group, etc.) and when the presence of the tokens in the group is
new. In these circumstances, tokens are more visible (and the numerically less they are the
more visible they are). Third, the presence of tokens reinforces the features of the dominant
group and as such polarizes dominants against tokens while at the same time essentializing
the particular characteristics of individuals in the token group into a stereotypical portrait of
“the token.”
To test the validity of this general theory, Kanter studied the sales force of a U.S. company,
the population of which was approximately 300, within which there were about 20 women.
This study revealed three patterned behaviors. First, due to their visibility the token women
experienced a range of performance pressures including an increase in demands to publicly
prove their worth and the need to emphasize their achievements despite fear of retaliation if a
token woman performed better than her male dominants. Against these performance
pressures token women reacted in two patterned ways—either overachieving to prove their
worth or seeking invisibility (leading to the generalization that women are intrinsically
nonaspirational or fear success).
The second patterned behavior identified by Kanter was boundary heightening. The male
dominants exaggerated their own culture (especially in the presence of token women, with
stories of sexual and sporting prowess, for example) and reminded token women of their
(essential) differences. They also “quarantined” token women from particular occasions and
SAGE SAGE Reference
Contact SAGE Publications at http://www.sagepub.com.
The SAGE Encyclopedia of Political BehaviorPage 3 of 7  
tested the loyalty of tokens to the dominant culture. This latter element of dominant-token
relations is particularly important: Frequently dominants may ask tokens to renounce an
essential element of token culture in order to reinforce the validity of the dominant culture over
token culture. Kanter cited the example of women on the sales force behaving in male-like
ways and making fun of stereotypical (token) women traits. In response to this patterned
situation, tokens can either accept the isolation from both the dominant and token groups or
continually seek to prove their loyalty to the dominant culture and endure the charge that they
have betrayed their token group (whether this be based on gender, ethnicity, or social class).
The third set of patterned dynamics Kanter labeled role entrapment. This plays out in two
ways. First, based on their essentialized characteristics, the status of tokens is often taken to
be other than what it actually is. In Kanter’s study, sales force women were assumed to be
secretaries, yet the phenomenon of misidentification could apply in a host of other settings to
(a Hispanic man in a university who is assumed to be a cleaner rather than an academic, for
example). Second, tokens can be ascribed a series of caricatured roles and only these. Again,
Kanter’s examples are specific to her study: Following a general Freudian line of reasoning,
men characterize women as either Madonnas or whores (the “mother” or the “seductress”)
and the roles that are ascribed to these types—for example the mother token is assumed to
be emotionally intelligent, while the token seductress may introduce behavior of sexual
competition and jealousy between male colleagues and be the object of resentment when
advances are rejected or be labeled a whore when they are. Again, this role entrapment is
generalizable across other populations characterized by dominant-token ratios, and in all
cases tokens are thought of as only occupying particular roles. The possibility of mobility—
either upward or downward—is constrained by these caricatured roles.
Kanter argues that it is easier for tokens to conform to caricatured roles rather than challenge
them, and that this is so in large part because of the numbers: in effect, 20% or less renders
change difficult and even when tokens succeed they do so at a personal cost, having to
expend extra effort, being isolated from both the dominant and token groups, such that
genuine tokens—people of a nondominant group that actually succeed—are rare.
This leads to two generalizable points about tokens that are reflected in other studies. First,
the main role of tokens within society is to act as a symbol that mobility—particularly upward
mobility—is possible. Second, because of this, once a particular population has in place a
token—or even several tokens—it makes it harder for other individuals with the same master-
status traits to achieve this status.
Modern sociological literature concerned with tokens and tokenism reflects these two general
characteristics of the phenomenon. For example, Judith Long Laws makes both these claims
in her discussion of the careers of token women academics, inclusive of the observation that
the relationship between a particular token and the dominant group will often be mediated by
a sponsor. In his discussion of children’s participation in democratic political process for the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Roger A. Hart discusses the tokenism of placing
children (often well-spoken and attractive) on deliberative panels without ever intending to
seriously take into consideration their views. In their work published in Social Forces, Pamela
B. Jackson, Peggy A. Thoits, and Howard F. Taylor (1995) examined the psychological well-
being of 167 African Americans occupying elite positions. Their respondents reported feelings
of isolation despite experiencing multiple demands on their time—serving on committees,
panels, and policy sessions, for example—due to their token status.
However, from a structural perspective, the principal function of a token is to maintain the
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belief that upward mobility is possible. A very clear example of this is provided in Dana
Cloud’s 1996 study of biographies of U.S. talk-show host Oprah Winfrey. Cloud cites one
appreciative account of Winfrey’s career:
The journey of Oprah Gail Winfrey from Hattie Mae’s pig farm in Mississippi to the
pinnacle of wealth, power, and success in American television is a journey we must
all admire…. She is the ultimate American success story. That a tiny, illegitimate
black girl from dirt-poor Mississippi can transform herself into the richest and most
powerful black woman in the world is a triumph of the human spirit and the American
dream. (Mair, 1994, p. 349, quoted in Cloud, p. 115)
Cloud emphasizes that this portrayal of the American Dream (the same discussed by Merton)
as achievable, alongside other representations of the possibility of material success (Stephen
Spielberg’s film The Color Purple and popular television sitcom The Cosby Show, for example)
belie the reality of socioeconomic inequality in the United States when measured by income
and ethnicity.
To summarize, if we define politics in terms of the pattern of outcomes (material and
otherwise) generated by a particular society, tokenism is defined as the practice of satisfying,
or placating the moral requirement for the inclusion of structurally disadvantaged people in
groups that are better placed in terms of the outcomes of a particular society, thereby
maintaining the idea that this mobility is available to all individuals when in fact it is not. We
now move to the second understanding of tokenism. We have also seen that according to
Kanter tokenism plays out in particular ways in the relationships between dominants and
tokens in particular group settings, again with the effect of holding out the possibility of
upward mobility yet denying it to all.
Tokenism and Symbolism in Politics
Many social scientists—such as the sociologists discussed above, for example—might object
to the identification of a specifically political realm, or field of behavior, arguing that all events
ought to be understood as political in the broad sense deployed above. However, just as
sociologists worked to define (and refine) their field of inquiry, political scientists lay claim to a
specific realm, namely the institutions and practices of politics set against other areas of
society, the economy and the family, for example.
The most salient form of tokenism in the specifically political realm is precisely the same as
the broader phenomenon of tokenism but found in politics. For example in 2014, the (then)
prime minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, was accused of “female tokenism” by the
Conservative MP Richard Drax when he appointed two junior women ministers to cabinet. In
2004, following the announcement that Barack Obama would run for the U.S. Senate as a
Democratic candidate for the state of Illinois, the Republican Party was accused of “the
politics of tokenism” in appointing their own African American candidate, Alan Keys, in the
same state.
However, tokenism in politics can be defined as having a more general rhetorical utility than
that denoted in the meaning thus far described. By setting the concept of tokenism against
the more general concept of symbolism, this more general utility is revealed.
In his discussion, Jeff Archer makes four claims about symbolism in politics. First, understood
as the practice of imparting myths and symbols, symbolism is overwhelmingly important and
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can even be seen as a necessary precursor to political action. Second, symbolic political
messages are affective and can be profoundly so—think here of the ideational political politics
of belonging involved in nationalism or any other powerfully expressed political ideal. Third,
symbolism in politics necessarily demarcates between one set of ideas and practices—its own
—and those which are not. Fourth, in the thrust and parry of political contestation (whether
this be democratic contest or otherwise) opposing forces continually deploy symbols and
myths when quite a lot of the time they claim to be using only facts and reason. We will return
to this claim immediately below. Nevertheless, the point in this context is to emphasize the
pervasiveness of symbolism in politics as put forward by Archer.
Understood in this sense, it is possible to read political symbolism into any artifact or event.
Even if we confine ourselves to symbolism in the specifically political arena identified above,
examples still abound. A multitude of artifacts project meaning beyond their mere physical
form: Lenin’s Mausoleum in Red Square in Moscow is not merely the place where Vladimir
Lenin’s body is housed but invokes the spirit of Soviet communism; similar observations can
be made about the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor or Nelson’s Column in London’s
Trafalgar Square. Further, political rhetoric can be just as symbolic and just as pervasive. For
instance, John F. Kennedy entreating, “My fellow Americans, ask not what your country can
do for you, ask what you can do for your country” can be understood as profoundly symbolic
of American politics at the time. Moreover, a particular act can be seen as broadly symbolic of
greater events. For example, the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2015, a trade deal
involving 12 countries centered on the Pacific Rim, can be seen as profoundly symbolic of
global economic integration—although whether or not this is a good thing is open to dispute.
Against the pervasiveness and importance of symbolism, we can define tokenism as the
practice of appeasing or placating a demand for a particular course of action. Further, it is
important to emphasize that this act of placation is generally perceived as not merely
unsatisfactory by way of its quantum or amount; it is also perceived as being morally
inadequate. For example, in the Australian political context, the political interests of
nonmetropolitan (rural, regional, and remote communities) have traditionally been
represented by the conservative National Party (formerly the Country Party). In 2014, the
metropolitan-based Australian Labor Party attempted to reinvigorate its support base in rural
areas by holding a “Country Caucus.” This act was labeled “tokenism” by the (then) head of
the National Party, Warren Truss.
Finally, the delineation between symbolism on the one hand and tokenism on the other hand
can be a fine one, but nevertheless extremely important. Thus, in his discussion of
prosecutions at the conclusion of World War II, M. Cherif Bassiouni argued that to prosecute
the few for the crimes of the many would, under most circumstances, be viewed as tokenism;
but that due to their standing in the respective Nazi and Japanese regimes, the 22 individuals
prosecuted at Nuremberg and the 28 individuals prosecuted at Tokyo were “appropriate
symbols” at that time. This is despite the fact that in the case of the Tokyo trials, some that fell
in the symbolic category, namely the Japanese emperor and his uncle, were excluded from
prosecution.
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